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1 James Pfander and Nassim Nazemi offer a radical reinterpretation of the federal Anti-Injunction Act of 1793, at least as measured by the conventional wisdom that the statute enacted a "sweeping prohibition" providing in "manifest . . . terms" that "proceedings in the state courts should be free from interference by federal injunction"-period. 2 Federal bankruptcy proceedings provide a natural testing ground for the validity of these competing interpretations. If the 1793 Act had been an absolute bar to federal courts enjoining state court proceedings, it would have presented a formidable obstacle to efficacious administration of federal bankruptcy laws, which lean very heavily upon federal courts' injunctive powers. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the federal courts' administration of nineteenth-century bankruptcy legislation aroused federalism tensions similar to those that had produced the 1793 Act, including a very confrontational exchange between New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice Joel Parker and U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story. The manner in which the courts navigated and ultimately resolved those conflicts, though, 
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Response 69 debt-restructuring scheme. 6 And in a federalist system in which creditors' rights against their debtor (in the absence of bankruptcy proceedings) are enforced principally through the state courts, provision for the federal courts sitting in bankruptcy to enjoin creditors' state court proceedings would seem to be an indispensable aspect of any federal bankruptcy law, by its very nature. 7 Modern law fully reflects that supposition that injunctive relief is an indispensable component of bankruptcy relief. The principal means by which federal bankruptcy law ensures that its debt restructuring is both comprehensive and compulsory is via a pair of statutory injunctions that restrain, inter alia, creditors' state court actions-the automatic stay 8 and the discharge injunction 9 -and federal bankruptcy courts are also expressly granted equitable injunctive powers via a bankruptcy version of the All Writs Act. 10 Moreover, each of these statutorily authorized bankruptcy injunctions is expressly excepted from the modern codification of the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) as "an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court . . . expressly authorized by Act of Congress." 12. Act of June 20, 1874, tit. 13, ch. 12, § 720, 18 Stat. 136 (1875) . When the AIA was amended after the Toucey decision, the specific bankruptcy exception was removed and replaced by the general exception for any injunction expressly authorized by another federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (historical and revision notes).
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Texas Law Review See Also [Vol. 92:67 inserted in the Act of 1793 by the Revisers" compiling the 1874 comprehensive codification of the Revised Statutes of the United States in order to acknowledge the federal injunctive powers expressly authorized by the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.
II. Federal Injunctions Under Nineteenth Century Bankruptcy Law
Under the short-lived bankruptcy act that preceded the 1867 Bankruptcy Act-the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, which was repealed in 1843 14 -decades before codification of the specific bankruptcy exception to the AIA, the extent to which the bankruptcy laws actually authorized such a stay of state court proceedings was a matter of prominent dispute. Moreover, the meaning and effect of the 1793 AIA itself figured prominently (even when implicitly so) in that dispute. That dispute, therefore, provides an illuminating context against which to test the Pfander-Nazemi thesis regarding the meaning of the 1793 statute. Significantly, the manner in which that dispute was argued, particularly as between Justices Story and Baldwin, is fully consistent with the Pfander-Nazemi interpretation of the 1793 Act-i.e., that its prohibition against "writs of injunction" to stay state court proceedings (sought via an original bill through a suit in equity) did not prohibit ancillary relief in the nature of an injunction (sought via motion or petition) granted in an equitable proceeding principally seeking relief other than or independent of such an injunction, but for which an injunctive decree (not via a "writ of injunction") might nonetheless be necessary or appropriate.
That distinction born of equity practice-between an original bill praying for a "writ of injunction" and an ancillary motion or petition seeking relief in the nature of an injunction-was ultimately lost in the merger of law and equity, which itself had begun in earnest by the middle of the nineteenth 13. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 132 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.). The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 remained in effect until its repeal in 1878. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878). Section 21 of the 1867 Act provided that "no creditor whose debt is provable under this act shall be allowed to prosecute to final judgment any suit at law or in equity therefor against the bankrupt, until the question of the debtor's discharge shall have been determined; and any such suit or proceedings shall, upon the application of the bankrupt, be stayed to await the determination of the court in bankruptcy on the question of the discharge." Id. § 21, 14 Stat. 517, 526-27. Upon grant of the bankruptcy discharge, it was then incumbent upon the discharged bankrupt to present the certificate of discharge in any state court actions (pending or thereafter commenced) as an affirmative defense against suits on discharged debts. 
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Response 71 century. 15 As Pfander and Nazemi skillfully demonstrate, though, when the AIA was enacted in 1793, that distinction would have been apparent to practicing lawyers, as revealed by prominent equity-practice treatises of the day.
Pfander and Nazemi acknowledge that they can point to "no contemporaneous statements that describe the Act in precisely the[] terms" posited by their original-ancillary interpretation. 16 If the Pfander-Nazemi interpretation of the 1793 Act is correct, though, one might expect to find it reflected (if only implicitly) in the Story-Baldwin dispute regarding the scope of federal bankruptcy courts' injunctive powers under the 1841 Bankruptcy Act. Justice Story was clearly familiar with the original-ancillary distinction, which he discussed in his equity treatise. 17 Moreover, Justice Story was particularly expert in bankruptcy law and is widely reputed to have been the principal draftsman of the federal Bankruptcy Act of 1841.
18
Like Pfander and Nazemi, I have been unable to find in the early bankruptcy cases any direct statements describing the scope of the 1793 AIA in terms of the original-ancillary distinction. Nonetheless, various aspects of those cases are consistent with and explained well by the Pfander-Nazemi original-ancillary account, which I find entirely plausible and highly persuasive.
A. Exclusive Federal In Rem Jurisdiction = Automatic Stay of State Court Proceedings
The principles of exclusive in rem jurisdiction that Pfander and Nazemi discuss as illustrative of ancillary relief in the nature of an injunction (and, thus, not barred by the 1793 AIA according to their account) have obvious and natural application to bankruptcy proceedings. Indeed, even before the 1874 bankruptcy exception to the AIA, it was widely recognized that vesting of the bankrupt's property in the bankruptcy trustee (formerly denominated the assignee) as the court-appointed representative of the bankrupt's "estate," had the effect of automatically enjoining any state court interference with that property. One nineteenth-century bankruptcy judge 19 nicely summarized this injunctive feature of exclusive in rem jurisdiction as follows:
The estate surrendered is placed in the custody of the [federal] court so sitting in bankruptcy, and the officer (assignee or trustee) appointed to manage it, is accountable to the court appointing him, and that court alone. No state court has jurisdiction in, or can withdraw the property surrendered, or determine in any degree the manner of its disposition. . . . The filing of a petition in bankruptcy at once brings the property of the insolvent into the bankruptcy court, and places it in its custody and under its protection as fully as if actually brought into the visible presence of the court. Being in the custody of the court, no other court can, without the permission of the court in bankruptcy, interfere with it, and so to interfere is a contempt of the bankrupt court.
20
Those general principles of exclusive in rem jurisdiction (automatically giving rise to relief in the nature of an injunction), however, could have no application to a bankrupt's property already in the possession of a state court upon the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings. The question that arose under the 1841 bankruptcy statute, therefore, was the extent to which a federal bankruptcy court could, nonetheless, affirmatively enjoin such a state court proceeding. ) (citing English authorities for the proposition that "a commission and decree, declaring a man to be a bankrupt, has been emphatically said to be a statute execution for all the creditors").
B. Property in the Possession of a State Court: Herein of the Attachment Controversy
With respect to property already in the possession of a state court upon commencement of the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings, the context that produced the sharpest controversy involved state prejudgment attachment procedures (as distinguished from postjudgment levy of execution), by which creditors could, upon commencement of suit on a debt, reach (by writ of attachment) identified property of their debtor that the sheriff would attach (by seizing possession) and hold pending and to secure payment of any judgment the creditor might ultimately procure in the suit. English bankruptcy statutes, 21 the prior Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 22 and the subsequent Bankruptcy Act of 1867 23 expressly dissolved such prejudgment attachments in pending suits, but the 1841 Bankruptcy Act contained no such provision.
Attachment creditors, therefore, contended that they had a secured priority payment right in attached assets that was expressly preserved by the lien-saving provision of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act, 24 and thus, their suits could proceed to judgment notwithstanding their debtor's bankruptcy filing, in order to fix their priority in the attached assets (by postjudgment levy of execution on the attached assets). Perhaps the omission of any express statutory provision negating prejudgment attachments was simply a drafting oversight that Justice Story sought to correct by judicial construction; perhaps not. But Justice Story interpreted the statute essentially as if it did contain such a provision, through a rather involved (and somewhat convoluted) reasoning process.
First, Story concluded that a prejudgment attachment on mesne process did not create a "lien" in favor of the attachment creditor within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act's lien-saving provision. 26 For Story, then, attachment creditors had no legitimate secured priority payment right in attached assets, which should (according to Story) be available for pro-rata distribution amongst the debtor's general unsecured creditors (which included attachment creditors). Story also concluded (purportedly in the alternative) that the federal district courts, sitting in bankruptcy, should enjoin attachment creditors in pending suits from prosecuting their suits to judgment and execution. 27 That latter conclusion, however, was obviously shaped by Story's view that an attachment creditor had to be considered an unsecured rather than a secured creditor and, thus, in the absence of an injunction, "the attaching creditor, by a race of diligence, [would] be allowed to obtain . . . a preference [over other unsecured creditors] in violation of the whole policy of the bankrupt act, which is an equal distribution of the assets among all the [unsecured] creditors." 28 That latter conclusion (that attachment creditors' pending suits should be enjoined) was also shaped, though, by Story's view regarding the equity jurisdiction of the federal district courts sitting as courts of bankruptcy. This was a matter entirely independent and distinct from the attachment controversy itself, but the attachment controversy forced an articulation of the scope of (and limits on) federal bankruptcy courts' equity powers. And, of course, it is this aspect of the attachment controversy that implicated the 1793 AIA. Along the judicial federalism dimension of the full subject-matter scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, Justice Story's interpretation of the outermost bounds of the 1841 grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to the federal district courts departed significantly from the more limited meaning and scope of "bankruptcy proceedings" in England. 29 His general view, though, ultimately prevailed and has endured as the intellectual foundation for determining the scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. 31 Under the 1841 bankruptcy statute, though, the district courts' equity jurisdiction was every bit as broad as that of the federal circuit courts-federal trial courts at that time, with both law and equity jurisdiction.
32 Indeed, the 1841 Act expressly provided that "the [district] courts shall have full authority and jurisdiction to compel obedience to all orders and decrees passed by them in bankruptcy, by process of contempt and other remedial process, to the same extent the circuit courts may now do in any suit pending therein in equity." 33 In Ex parte Foster, in the context of the attachment controversy, Story described the district courts' broad equity jurisdiction in bankruptcy as follows:
Before proceeding to consider the questions, which have been argued, I wish to say a few words as to the jurisdiction of the district court in the premises. And here I lay it down as a general principle, that the district court is possessed of the full jurisdiction of a court of equity, over the whole subject-matters which may arise in bankruptcy, and is authorized by summary proceedings to administer all the relief which a court of equity could administer under the like circumstances, upon a regular bill and regular proceedings, instituted by competent parties. In this respect, the act of congress, for wise purposes, has conferred a more wide and liberal jurisdiction upon the courts of the United States than the lord chancellor, sitting in bankruptcy, was authorized to exercise. In short, whatever he might properly do, sitting in bankruptcy, or sitting in the court of chancery, under his general equity jurisdiction, the courts of the United States are by the act of 1841 competent to do. So that the question resolves itself, so far as the exercise of jurisdiction for relief in this case is concerned, into this, whether it is a fit case for interposition and relief by a court of equity.
34

B. Summary Proceedings on Motion and Plenary Suits Against Adverse Claimants
Story made the above-quoted statement against the backdrop of an established jurisdictional and procedural divide, imported from England, separating "summary" bankruptcy proceedings (coming within the Lord Chancellor's jurisdiction in bankruptcy), from "plenary" suits at law and in equity against "adverse claimants" (conducted in the superior courts). 35 The 1841 Bankruptcy Act contained two jurisdictional grants. Section 6 granted the district courts "jurisdiction in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy," including "all acts, matters, and things to be done under and in virtue of the bankruptcy," which jurisdiction was, by its terms, "to be exercised summarily, in the nature of summary proceedings in equity," initiated by petition or motion.
36 Section 8, by contrast, was a grant of jurisdiction to both the district court (in which the debtor's initial petition for bankruptcy relief was filed) and the circuit court for that district "of all suits at law and in equity . . . by any assignee of the bankrupt against any person or persons claiming an adverse interest, or by such [adverse claimant] against such assignee," requiring an independent plenary suit, commenced by a formal bill or complaint. 
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C. Summary Proceedings Against Adverse Claimants
One might assume, therefore, that the 1841 bankruptcy statute merely replicated the English dividing line between summary bankruptcy proceedings ( § 6) and plenary suits against adverse claimants ( § 8). While it certainly did replicate the procedural distinction between "summary proceedings in equity" ( § 6) and formal plenary "suits at law and in equity" ( § 8), it did not necessarily replicate English notions regarding the scope of those disputes subsumed within the concept of "all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy" over which the district courts had jurisdiction (under § 6) sitting as a bankruptcy court in a manner analogous to Chancery's bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Story's above-quoted statement was an early indication of his view (that would ultimately prevail) that the district courts' jurisdiction under § 6 of the 1841 Act over "all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy" was much broader than English notions of the "bankruptcy proceedings" proper. Story interpreted § 6 as an all-encompassing grant that subsumed even those actions that previously would have been regarded as disputes with adverse claimants-plenary matters. Moreover, and most significantly for our present purposes, he hewed to this view notwithstanding the fact that § 6 expressly authorized adjudication of "all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy" through "summary proceedings in equity." 38 The upshot of Story's broad interpretation of the scope of § 6, therefore, was that traditionally plenary matters that could only be adjudicated in a fullblown plenary suit in a superior court in England-Story's reference to "all the relief which a court of equity could administer under the like circumstances, upon a regular bill and regular proceedings, instituted by competent parties" 39 -could nonetheless be adjudicated by a district court, sitting in bankruptcy, through summary proceedings. Nazemi original-ancillary interpretation of the 1793 AIA, if correct, is profoundly significant. Because the district court exercised its § 6 bankruptcy jurisdiction via "summary proceedings in equity," whatever equitable relief was available from a district court, sitting in bankruptcy, could be granted upon an ancillary motion or petition through "summary proceedings in equity," without the need for an original bill, e.g., for a "writ of injunction." Thus, the relief sought in Ex parte Foster was from the district court, by petition, praying "that an injunction may be granted against [the bankrupt's] attaching creditors, enjoining them from further proceeding against [the attached] property of [the bankrupt], and requiring them to surrender the same to such assignee as may be appointed by this honorable court in the premises." 40 Under the PfanderNazemi theory, then, because the 1793 AIA simply did not apply to such ancillary relief in the nature of an injunction, it would pose no obstacle whatsoever to the equitable relief requested in Foster.
And, indeed, consistent with the Pfander-Nazemi theory, Story expressly analogized the injunctive relief he authorized in that case, at length, to one of the most prominent and well-established instances of ancillary injunctive relief:
There is no novelty in this course. On the contrary, it is the common course in all cases, where upon the application of any creditor, or of an administrator or executor, a court of equity takes upon itself the administration of the assets of a deceased debtor. As soon as the decree for the administration is passed by the court, taking upon itself the administration of the assets, the executor, or administrator, or any creditor, is entitled to an injunction to prevent any other of the creditors from suing the executor or administrator at law, or further proceeding in any suit, already commenced, except under the direction and control of the court of equity, by which the decree is passed; for, under such circumstances, the court will not suffer a race of diligence by different creditors, each striving for an undue mastery, or preference, or priority of payment out of the assets, to prejudice the rights of the others. The decree in such a case is treated as a judgment for all the creditors. But it is not necessary to put it upon that ground; for when once the administration of the assets is taken by the court upon itself, as a matter of duty, it must be of course, that it cannot and ought not to permit any creditor to defeat, or to obstruct, or to interfere, with its own proceedings. Now this is precisely the situation of the district court, as to proceedings in bankruptcy, after a decree in bankruptcy. The court necessarily takes upon itself the administration of all the assets; and it 40. Id. at 508.
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is its duty to protect the property against all claims of creditors, which are inconsistent with the objects and policy of the act. I have no doubt, therefore, that it is the duty of the district court to issue an injunction in this case to the attaching creditor, directing him not to proceed in his suit, except under the order and direction of the court, until it shall be ascertained, whether there is a decree in bankruptcy, and a discharge of the bankrupt, which may be pleaded in bar of farther proceedings.
41
While Justice Story made no mention of the 1793 AIA and why it would not bar that injunctive relief in Ex Parte Foster, within a couple of months, he expressly opined in the case of Ex parte Carlton, "as a matter of general practice in cases of this sort, which are growing numerous," that neither the 1793 AIA, nor the 1807 extension of its restrictions to district court judges (when exercising the circuit court's power to grant writs of injunction), were applicable to district courts' equity powers under § 6 of the 1841 bankruptcy statute:
The district court, sitting in bankruptcy, has general equity jurisdiction, and may summarily do whatever a court of equity may do in the ordinary course of its practice and proceedings. . . . Now, there is no statute of the United States, which imposes the slightest limitation upon the exercise of the power to issue injunctions, or requires notice thereof, unless in cases provided for by the act of congress of the 2d of March, 1793, [ § 5], and the act of congress of the 13th of February, 1807. But neither of these statutes has any application to cases in bankruptcy in the district courts, nor, indeed, to any cases except those which are pending in the circuit court in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction. The former act [applies] . . . in causes pending in the circuit court. The latter act confers authority on the district judges to grant injunctions in like manner [and subject to the same restrictions] in all cases pending in the circuit court. These acts, therefore do not touch the jurisdiction of the district court in the administration of equity in bankrupt cases. And as they do not contemplate the classes of cases created by the bankrupt act of 1841, it is obvious that their provisions are inapplicable to it; and leave the jurisdiction [of the district court] to grant injunctions upon the general practice and principles which govern courts of equity. This is certainly consistent with the Pfander-Nazemi theory's implication that the 1793 statute's express application to only "writs of injunction" could not restrict a federal district court's grant of injunctive relief on motion or petition under § 6 of the 1841 bankruptcy statute. Morever, in another case, in response to a direct argument that the 1793 AIA barred a district court, sitting in bankruptcy, from enjoining state court proceedings and citing Diggs v. Wolcott, 43 the district court flatly rejected that argument by relying, in succession, upon (1) the above-quoted passage from Ex parte Foster regarding district courts' broad equity jurisdiction "authorized by summary proceedings," 44 and (2) the above-quoted passage from Ex parte Carlton.
45
Of course, the above-quoted passage from Carlton is also consistent with an even broader bankruptcy exemption from the 1793 AIA related to the manner in which the 1807 Act made the AIA's restrictions applicable to district court judges. Since the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the federal district courts no equity jurisdiction, the 1807 Act itself was an affirmative grant to district court judges of "full power to grant writs of injunctions . . . in all cases which may come before the circuit courts within their respective districts . . . under the same rules, regulations and restrictions, as are prescribed by the several acts of Congress," 46 such as the 1793 AIA. According to Story, though, district courts sitting in bankruptcy derived their power to issue injunctions 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335. Story's reasoning in the quoted text, though, clearly concluded that neither the power nor the notice clause of the 1793 AIA "touch the jurisdiction of the district court in the administration of equity in bankrupt cases" (and noted that "nothing is more common than for a court of equity, in its discretion, to grant an injunction ex parte, without notice to the other side, the injunction, however, to continue only until the other party chooses to appear and contest it, and move for its dissolution"). Ex Parte Carlton, 5 F. Cas. at 87; see also ROBERT HENLEY EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 64-65 (1822) (describing such a case of an ex parte ancillary motion by the plaintiff requesting restraint of defendant's suit at law on which "Lord Eldon granted the injunction, the plaintiff undertaking to serve the defendant with immediate notice").
43. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1807). In addressing "the position assumed by the counsel for the mortgage creditors as to the powers and authorities of this court in granting injunctions," the court stated:
The right of this court to issue injunctions under its chancery powers was not disputed, but it was contended in the argument at the bar that this court has no authority to order injunctions against suitors in a state court, and the counsel rested their argument on the 5th section of the judiciary act of congress of March 2, 1793, which directs that no writs of injunction shall be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state; quoting, in support of their view of the subject, the decision in the case of 48. Professor Mayton argues that the 1793 AIA was applicable only to circuit court writs of injunction granted by a single justice of the Supreme Court while the circuit court itself (composed of a district court judge and a Supreme Court circuit justice) was not sitting (i.e., was "in vacation") and, thus, did not restrict the ability of the circuit court sitting as a court to grant writs of injunction staying state court proceedings. See generally Mayton, supra note 2. In Ex parte Foster, immediately after his analogy to recognized instances of ancillary injunctive relief (quoted supra at text accompanying note 41), Story also stated:
If, indeed, I entertained any doubt upon this subject, (which I certainly do not) I should not entertain any doubt as to the jurisdiction of the circuit court upon a bill [in a "suit in equity" under § 8 of the 1841 Act], filed by the assignee, after his appointment, to overhaul and control, or set aside all the [state court] proceedings, had in the intermediate time by the attaching creditor against the rights of the other creditors, and in subversion of the policy and objects, of the bankrupt act of 1841. It would, therefore, after all, be but a postponement of the evil day, and a mere change from the equity jurisdiction of one court to the like jurisdiction of another court having full authority to act in the premises. Ex parte Foster, 9 F. Cas. at 519. Since such a "suit in equity" via a formal bill presumably would pray for a "writ of injunction," Story's reasoning in that passage might be inconsistent with the Pfander-Nazemi original-ancillary account, but consistent with Mayton's single-justice theory that the 1793 AIA did not restrict the ability of the circuit court as a court to grant a "writ of injunction." Alternatively, though, perhaps Story believed that the 1793 AIA did restrict the grant of a "writ of injunction" by even a "circuit court in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction," Carlton, 5 F. Cas. at 87 (emphasis added), by which Story may have meant the circuit court's nonbankruptcy jurisdictioni.e., that the 1793 AIA was inapplicable to injunctions granted under either § 6 or § 8 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act. That latter interpretation is inconsistent with Mayton's single-justice theory, but consistent with the Pfander-Nazemi original-ancillary theory. For an example of such a circuit court decision (by the court) enjoining state court proceedings on a formal bill in a suit in equity praying for an injunction under § 8 of the Bankruptcy Act, but without any explanation as to why the 1793 AIA did not bar the injunction, see regarding federal district courts' equity jurisdiction, sitting in bankruptcy, could stand independent of the attachment controversy itself, perceived overreaching by Story with respect to the attachment controversy inflamed federalism sensitivities. The immediate response to Ex parte Foster, therefore, invoked the 1793 AIA, but in a limited fashion that is also fully consistent with the Pfander-Nazemi thesis.
A. The Attachment Controversy Spreads
In opining that an execution creditor had no lien on the attached property, within the meaning of the lien-saving provision of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act, Justice Story reasoned that even a judgment creditor who had levied execution on the debtor's property prebankruptcy (through the sheriff's seizure of possession) did not have a lien on that property within the meaning of the bankruptcy statute. 49 Shortly after Story's Foster decision, though, Justice Baldwin rendered an opinion (also riding circuit) in Dudley's Case 50 directly implicating and disagreeing with Story's dicta regarding execution creditors.
51
B. The 1793 AIA and Federal Bankruptcy Courts' Injunctive Powers
Justice Baldwin's construction of the lien-saving statute was sufficient, in and of itself, to affirm the district court's decision-denying the bankrupt's petition requesting an injunction to restrain execution creditors from proceeding to a postbankruptcy sale of the property on which execution had levied prebankruptcy. 52 Justice Baldwin went on, though, in the alternative, to opine (at length) that even "if the case was otherwise" and the levy of execution gave the execution creditors no lien on the property seized under the process of the state court (as Justice Story had concluded in Foster), "we are well satisfied that the district court could not grant the injunction asked for by any authority under the judiciary, or the bankrupt act." 53 This alternative holding apparently was also a direct counter to Story's Foster opinion regarding district courts' injunctive powers under the 1841 Bankruptcy Act. Justice Baldwin's point of departure was the backdrop of (1) the Judiciary Act of 1789, which "gave the district court no jurisdiction in cases in equity," 55 and (2) the 1793 AIA's ban on writs of injunction to stay state court proceedings. 56 Justice Baldwin took the preexisting restrictions of the 1789 Judiciary Act and the 1793 AIA as compelling reasons to narrowly construe the scope of § 6 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act as denying district courts, sitting in bankruptcy, the power to enjoin state court proceedings:
Thus restricted, it is most clear that the power of a district judge or court cannot enjoin state process, by any authority of law previous to the bankrupt act of 1841. The bankrupt act of 1800 gave no such power, and the present act is wholly silent on the subject, giving no color for its exercise, but on the contrary, carefully excluding it by the cautious and well defined terms of the sixth section, which specify the jurisdiction of the district court. . . . . . . . There is not a word in the sixth section which can be tortured into such a grant of power without a gratuitous interpolation, against all sound rules of interpreting statutes, which prescribe rules of action by courts. 57 * * * * * The granting [of] an injunction in any case is the exercise of the highest powers of a court of equity, never done in a doubtful case, or where it is not necessary for the purposes of justice which are not otherwise attainable. No case can occur where so much caution would be necessary as in interfering with the proceedings of the courts of a state, if an authority was given by express words in the law, but on a review of the whole legislation of congress on the subject, it is our opinion, that the power does not exist, and that its exercise is positively prohibited.
. Because he ultimately rested his decision on an interpretation of the terms of § 6 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act, however, Justice Baldwin did not posit the 1793 Act as a direct limitation on district courts' power to grant ancillary injunctive relief upon motion or petition under § 6. Indeed, Justice Baldwin's assumptions regarding the interplay between the 1793 AIA and the 1841 Bankruptcy Act are consistent with the Pfander-Nazemi interpretation of the 1793 Act.
C. The 1793 AIA and Ancillary Equitable Relief Through Summary Proceedings
Justice Baldwin's Dudley opinion expressly assumed that the 1793 AIA would be an effective bar to any stay of state court proceedings by either a district court or a circuit court in a plenary suit in equity under § 8 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act. 59 That assumption is, of course, entirely consistent with the Pfander-Nazemi theory that the 1793 AIA barred original bills for writs of injunction in suits in equity. Moreover, as the above-quoted passages make clear, Baldwin also assumed that if § 6 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act did grant district courts, sitting in bankruptcy, the power to enjoin state court proceedings ("the said jurisdiction to be exercised summarily . . . [via] summary proceedings in equity" 60 ), then that injunctive power would not be subject to the restrictions of the 1793 AIA. 61 That assumption, likewise, is fully consistent with the Pfander-Nazemi interpretation of the 1793 AIA as permitting injunctive relief via ancillary motion or petition-the summary process by which the injunction was sought from the district court in Dudley's Case. 62 59. "The provision of the eighth section is most wise and just; it puts cases at law and in equity as therein defined, (though between citizens of the same state,) on the same footing as patent and other cases arising under the laws of the United States," and in such a plenary suit in equity, the "court is prohibited by the act of 1793, from granting an injunction to stay proceedings in any court of a state," even "on the clearest case for an injunction according to the settled rules of courts of equity." Id. at 1158. In that regard, Baldwin's construction of the 1793 AIA seems inconsistent with Mayton's single-justice theory. See Mayton, supra note 2. Because he assumes that the 1793 AIA would also restrict a district court's equity jurisdiction under § 8 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act, Baldwin's interpretation of the 1793 AIA also seems inconsistent with the broad-based "bankruptcy exception" theory discussed supra at notes 46-47 and accompanying text-that the 1793 AIA only restricted district judges from issuing injunctions as a circuit court judge "in vacation" under the 1807 Act.
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VI. Justice Story and Ex parte Christy
In Ex parte Christy, the debtor (Walden) had borrowed $200,000 from the City Bank of New Orleans and given the Bank mortgages on a plantation and town lots.
65 About a year later, Walden sued the Bank in state court to have the mortgages invalidated as usurious. After trial, the state court declared the mortgages to be valid, and on Walden's appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the judgment for the Bank. The Bank then initiated state court foreclosure proceedings, the state court entered a judgment of foreclosure (alternatively referred to as an order of seizure and sale), and the sheriff effectuated seizure by levy on the premises. Approximately one month later, Walden filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief in the U.S. District Court for the District of Louisiana, and he was adjudicated a bankrupt.
Because the mortgaged property was already in the possession of the Louisiana state court before Walden's federal bankruptcy proceedings, there could be no automatic stay of the state court proceedings under the principles of exclusive in rem jurisdiction discussed above. 66 Thus, in the interim onemonth period between the date Walden filed his bankruptcy petition and the date the federal district court adjudicated him a bankrupt, the mortgaged premises were sold in execution of the previous judgment of foreclosure, and the Bank was the successful purchaser of the property, presumably by bidding in its mortgage debt.
After Walden was adjudicated a bankrupt, his assignee filed a petition in the federal district court, in its capacity as a court of bankruptcy, seeking to have both the postbankruptcy sale of the mortgaged premises and the mortgages themselves invalidated on the bases, inter alia, that fraud and illegality were involved in the foreclosure sale and the mortgages were usurious. In response to the assignee's petition, the Bank argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the assignee's petition. At that point, the district court adjourned specified questions into the circuit court, and the circuit court (via Justice McKinley) certified as its answers to those questions, inter alia, the following:
That the said District Court has, under the statute of bankruptcy, full and ample jurisdiction of all questions arising under the petition of William Christy, assignee of Walden, to try, adjudge, decree, and determine the same between the parties thereto. . . . [A] nd that said lastmentioned court has full power and authority to try and determine the validity of said mortgages, and if proved upon the trial void according to the laws of Louisiana, to make a decree accordingly." 67 Thereafter, the Bank directly filed a motion for a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court, arguing that the federal district court, sitting in bankruptcy, was proceeding without jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court (in an opinion by Justice Story) denied the requested writ on the ground that the district court was not exceeding its bankruptcy jurisdiction. There are several very noteworthy aspects of the Court's decision, as regards the Pfander-Nazemi interpretation of the 1793 AIA and its original-ancillary distinction.
A. An Equitable Relitigation Action
The Christy majority held that the federal district court had jurisdiction to relitigate the validity of the Bank's mortgages in the assignee's action, notwithstanding the previous judgments from the Louisiana state court that the mortgages were valid (in suits in which only the debtor, Walden, and not Walden's bankruptcy estate, was party). Thus, the federal district court had jurisdiction "to inquire into and ascertain the validity and extent of such liens, mortgages, and other securities, and to grant the same remedial justice and relief to all the parties interested therein as the state courts might or ought to grant," upon the assignee's allegations that the Bank was "attempting to enforce a mortgage asserted to be illegal and invalid, and to procure a forced sale of the property by the sheriff, in an illegal and irregular manner" threatening "irreparable injury, or loss, or waste, of the assets."
68
B. Summary Proceedings Against an Adverse Claimant
A significant aspect of that decision as regards the Pfander-Nazemi interpretation of the 1793 AIA relates to the Bank's objection that the assignee had improperly requested relief by motion through summary proceedings (under § 6 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act) that could only be granted via an 
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original bill in a plenary suit in equity (under § 8). The Court, however, held to the contrary-that the federal district court could grant the requested relief in summary proceedings initiated by motion or petition under § 6, in lieu of a separate plenary suit on a formal bill under § 8. Against the background of the established distinction between summary bankruptcy proceedings (on motion or petition) and plenary suits at law or in equity against adverse claimants (on a formal complaint or bill), everyone in Christy acknowledged, and Justice Story expressly assumed, that the Bank (as regards the relief the assignee was seeking against the Bank) was an adverse claimant. Yet, the federal district court, acting on a petition filed by Walden's assignee (rather than an original bill), was proceeding by "summary proceedings in equity." 69 And that was the crux of the Bank's objection to the federal district court's jurisdiction:
To the supplemental and amended petition the bank put in an answer or plea, denying the jurisdiction of the District Court to take cognisance thereof, and insisting . . . that the District Court, sitting as a bankrupt court, and holding summary jurisdiction in matters of bankruptcy under the act of Congress [ § 6 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act], ought not to take cognisance of the petition and supplemental petition, inasmuch as all jurisdiction over the premises is by law vested in and of right belongs to the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana, holding jurisdiction in equity [under § 8] , and proceeding according to the forms and principles of chancery as prescribed by law, or to the District Court of the United States, proceeding in the same manner, and vested with concurrent jurisdiction [under § 8] over all suits at law or in equity brought by an assignee against any person claiming an adverse interest . . . . . . . . One ground urged in the declinatory plea of the bank to the supplemental petition, and also in argument here, is, that the District Court would have had jurisdiction in equity over the present case, if the suit had been by formal bill and other plenary proceedings according to the common course of such suits in the Circuit Court [under § 8], but that it has no right to sustain the suit in its present form of a summary proceeding in equity [under § 6]. 70 Justice Story (for the Court), however, rejected that argument and held that § 6's grant to the federal district courts of jurisdiction over "all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy" encompassed all claims by or against the bankrupt's estate (represented by the assignee). Moreover, this subsumed even those actions that previously would have been regarded as plenary suits against adverse claimants that could only be pursued through a separate formal suit at law or in equity, and notwithstanding the fact that § 6 authorized adjudication of such claims in summary proceedings rather than through a formal plenary suit.
71
C. The 1793 AIA and Equitable Relief Through Summary Proceedings
The significance of that holding for the Pfander-Nazemi originalancillary theory lies in the fact that the requested relief in Christy is very similar to the kind of equitable relitigation in federal court of a prior state court judgment that Pfander and Nazemi depict as the target of the 1793 AIA. 72 For example, had the assignee in bankruptcy filed his petition to invalidate the mortgages in the federal district court before the state court foreclosure sale took place, his petition undoubtedly would have requested an injunction to prevent the state court foreclosure sale from going forward. The Bank's above-articulated jurisdictional objection that the assignee could proceed only in a court "holding jurisdiction in equity, and proceeding according to the forms and principles of chancery," 73 therefore, would essentially have maintained that the assignee was required to seek a "writ of injunction" via an original bill in a plenary suit in equity under § 8 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act, rather than ancillary relief in the nature of an injunction on a mere petition through summary proceedings under § 6.
As regards the Pfander-Nazemi original-ancillary theory, therefore, the holding of Christy is a holding that in § 6 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act Congress expressly authorized an equitable relitigation action in federal court by way of ancillary petition or motion rather than via an original bill. If the 1793 AIA only prohibited stay of state court proceedings via the latter process and not the former (as Pfander and Nazemi posit), then the implication of the Christy holding is that any injunctive relief available under § 6, granted in "summary 
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Response 89 proceedings in equity," 74 was beyond the ban of the 1793 AIA. Indeed, Justice Story's majority opinion in Christy can be fairly read as implicitly adopting that interpretation of the interaction between the 1793 AIA and district courts' injunctive powers under § 6 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act.
D. Story on Equity Practice and Enjoining State Court Proceedings
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Christy decision as regards the Pfander-Nazemi interpretation of the 1793 AIA is what Justice Story's majority opinion expressly stated about enjoining state court proceedings. While this aspect of Story's opinion has been subsequently portrayed as dicta-a characterization that Pfander and Nazemi apparently accept 75 -it is not entirely clear that it was absolutely immaterial to the requested writ of prohibition before the Court (as Story's contemporaneous Christy critics alleged).
It is indeed true that any question regarding enjoining the state court foreclosure sale was moot, given that the sale took place before the assignee filed his petition in the federal district court challenging the validity of the sale and the mortgages. If the assignee succeeded in the federal district court in invalidating the Bank's mortgages, however, the assignee would necessarily also be requesting relief from (and essentially an injunction against the enforcement of) the prior state court judgments that the mortgages were valid. One can fully understand, therefore, why Justice Story would expressly opine on the federal district court's power to enjoin state court proceedings in his Christy opinion, particularly given Justice Baldwin's prior decision in Dudley's Case that § 6 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act did not grant federal district courts any power to enjoin state court proceedings. 76 According to Justice Baldwin, if an assignee's plenary suit on an original bill for a writ of injunction under § 8 of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act would be barred by the 1793 AIA (as Baldwin assumed was the case, consistent with the Pfander-Nazemi theory), then the assignee could too easily evade the AIA's ban on stays of state court proceedings if § 6 were interpreted to authorize the injunction nonetheless.
Indeed, Justice Story's Christy opinion expressly addressed just such an objection to his interpretation of the scope of § 6, although without expressly mentioning the 1793 AIA: It is farther objected that, if the jurisdiction of the District Court is as broad and comprehensive as the terms of the act justify according to the interpretation here insisted on, it operates or may operate to suspend or control all proceedings in the state courts either then pending or thereafter to be brought by any creditor or person having any adverse interest to enforce his rights or obtain remedial redress against the bankrupt or his assets after the bankruptcy. Given the ongoing debate over the extent of district courts' injunctive powers under the Bankruptcy Act, which continued even after Christy was decided, 83 it seems likely that the above-quoted portion of Justice Story's Christy opinion was referring to an AIA argument similar to Justice Baldwin's reasoning in Dudley's Case. And Justice Story's response was essentially a more succinct restatement of the analogy he had drawn in Ex parte Foster 84 to recognized instances of ancillary relief in the nature of an injunction, 85 which is, of course, entirely consistent with the Pfander-Nazemi original-ancillary interpretation of the 1793 AIA.
Regardless of whether Justice Story was expressly addressing the 1793 AIA in Christy, though, the structure of the argumentation and reasoning on both sides of the statutory construction debate appear to be fully consistent with and, thus, implicitly confirm the Pfander-Nazemi original-ancillary theory regarding the intended scope of the 1793 AIA. That latter challenge came in a case called Peck v. Jenness, which produced decisions from both the New Hampshire and the U.S. Supreme Courts. 90 The dangerous potential for discord (and even violence) in the wake of such a high-level antagonistic invitation for state and federal "peace" officers to entirely disregard each other's conflicting authorizations may well explain why the U.S. Supreme Court, in its subsequent Peck v. Jenness decision, completely called off the confrontation.
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The Court not only repudiated Justice Story's interpretation of the lien-saving provision of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act, but the Court also entirely ignored its prior Ex parte Christy opinion as regards federal bankruptcy courts' injunctive powers and essentially adopted the restrained interpretation of § 6 of the Bankruptcy Act that Justice Baldwin had proffered in Dudley's Case (and that is completely consistent with the Pfander-Nazemi interpretation of the 1793 AIA). In Bellows, the local New Hampshire sheriff and his deputy, who were in possession of goods and realty attached before the defendant-debtors' bankruptcy proceedings, by petition asked the federal district court for relief from that court's injunctive turnover order (entered in a summary proceeding 92. 14 N.H. 509 (1844). 93. Id. at 539. 94. Chief Justice Parker was bothered by the fact that the 1841 statute had no provision for appeals from decisions of the district court, sitting as a court of bankruptcy under § 6 of the Act. See id. at 510-11 (arguing that this violated the constitutional uniformity requirement for federal bankruptcy legislation). Justice Baldwin was also bothered by that particular feature of the 1841 Act and cited it repeatedly as yet another reason for a restrained interpretation of § 6 that denied federal district courts the power to enjoin state court proceedings. See Dudley's Case, 7 F. Cas. 1150, 1157-58 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 4114) (Baldwin, J.). Nonetheless, Chief Justice Parker expressly acknowledged that "[n]o exception has been taken by the plaintiff to the constitutionality of the act," and that "[i]t is no part of our purpose . . . to follow out the argument which thus presents itself, or to express an opinion upon the weight which might ultimately be found due to it." See id. at 510, 513 (but "[w]ere we disposed to raise a question of that description for our own consideration, it would be founded upon . . . .").
A. Parker's Opening
95 
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Response 95 * * * * * In respect to the right of the [federal] district court [sitting in bankruptcy] to issue such an injunction, it seems to me clear in principle; and it is a question of which that [federal district] court had exclusive cognizance; and it is not a matter inquirable into elsewhere, whether the jurisdiction was rightfully exercised or not. 100 Story acknowledged that such an ancillary injunction on motion or petition, "directing the sheriff and his deputy to deliver up the property, might involve them in some embarrassment and a double responsibility," 101 but suggested that the appropriate means to avoid such circumstances was through diligent control of the attaching creditors themselves via injunctions and appropriate enforcement thereof by the federal district court. Warren, so the opinion itself was almost exclusively a direct response to Story's Foster and Bellows decisions, and the entire tone of Parker's lengthy rebuttal was seething with umbrage and indignation. Noteworthy for our present purposes, moreover, is the fact that no injunction had issued from the federal bankruptcy court in that case; the defendant-debtor's bankruptcy was raised only collaterally in an effort to directly quash the plaintiff-creditor's prebankruptcy attachment in the New Hampshire state court that had effectuated it. 104 The Court, therefore, only needed to address (and disagree with) Justice Story's interpretation of the liensaving provision of the 1841 Act in order to hold that the plaintiff-attachment judgment which may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff. . . . Entertaining the opinions we do, we must hold him to this responsibility; and while we hold him thus liable, we are bound to protect him in the possession of the property, and in the application of the avails of it, against any such summary process.
We have faith to believe that the learned judge of the [federal] district court will not assume such a control over our dockets, as farther to enjoin the plaintiffs, in actions pending here, from proceeding in such manner as the courts of the State may allow; or such a control over final process here as to attempt to stop its execution.
If our opinions respecting his authority are correct, a resort to coercive measures, to enforce an injunction, or to punish a disregard of it, might possibly not be entirely safe, for those at least who should attempt to execute the order; but this is a matter upon which we shall not enter.
Should our faith on this subject prove unfounded, our course is clear. If this court is, in these cases, to be "taught what the United States is," it must be by the regular action of the supreme court of the Union, upon the judgments of the courts of the State, through the operation of a writ of error . . . . . . . . We disclaim any assumption of power to interfere with any rightful exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of the United States. But we as distinctly claim the right to take such measures as may be necessary to vindicate our own jurisdiction; and to execute our own process, in cases where we have jurisdiction, so long as our judgments stand unreversed. We sincerely deprecate all collision with those tribunals; and to prevent misapprehension, and guard, as far as may be in our power, against any danger of interference, we take occasion to say in conclusion, that if the plaintiffs in this, and other cases similarly situated, shall ask the interference of this court, it will be our duty to enjoin and prohibit the bankrupt, and his assignee, the creditors, and all claimants of the property attached, from attempting to procure any process, from any court which is not acting under the authority of this State, with a view to prevent the entry of judgments in such suits, or to prevent the execution of the final process issued upon the judgments when obtained; and from applying for, or attempting to execute any summary process, order, or decree of any court, with the view and purpose of taking from the creditors, or their attorneys, the fruits of such judgments as they may obtain, on account of any supposed want of right in the court to render those judgments, or any supposed invalidity of such
